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Casenote

Apprendi v. New Jersey: Should Any Factual
Determination Authorizing an Increase in a
Criminal Defendant's Sentence Be Proven to
a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?

In Apprendi v. New Jersey,' the United States Supreme Court held,
with the exception of the fact of prior criminal convictions, that any
factual determination that authorizes an increased sentence beyond the
statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.2

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of December 22, 1994, Petitioner Charles
C. Apprendi fired several .22 caliber bullets into the home of an
African-American family that had recently moved into a predominately
white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey. The police promptly
arrested Apprendi who later admitted that he had fired the shots.

1.

120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

2. Id. at 2362-63.
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Apprendi also made a statement, which he later retracted, that even
though he did not know the family personally, he fired the shots because
he wanted to deter the presence of African-Americans in the community.3 The shooting marked the fourth time the home had been fired upon
since the family moved into the neighborhood. 4
A New Jersey grand jury returned a twenty-three-count indictment
against Apprendi; however, it did not include a formal hate crime or
otherwise mention Apprendi's racially motivated purpose in committing
the crimes. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Apprendi later pled guilty to
two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose and one count of third-degree unlawful possession of an
antipersonnel bomb.' The State sought to have Apprendi's sentence
extended based on a New Jersey statute, which permits a sentence
enhancement if a trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that a defendant's criminal activities were motivated by racial bias.6
The trial court accepted the three guilty pleas and conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of Apprendi's purpose in committing the
December 22 shooting.7
Apprendi introduced a number of character witnesses, a psychologist
and his own testimony to rebut the State's contention. However, at the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found by a preponderance of
the evidence that Apprendi was motivated by racial bias. Consequently,
the trial judge imposed a twelve-year term of imprisonment on the
charge of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose
arising from the December 22 shooting. This sentence is two years
greater than the statutory maximum penalty for the offense. The trial
judge also imposed a shorter, concurrent sentence on the two remaining
counts.8

Apprendi appealed his sentence to the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey arguing, inter alia, that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires racial bias under the New
Jersey Hate Crime Statute to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.9

3. Id. at 2351.
4. Id. at 2352.
5. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C: 39-3(a) (West
1995)).
6. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:44-3(e) (West 1999)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1268 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), rev'd, 120
S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
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However, the court stated that because racial bias under the statute is
a "sentencing factor" and not an "element" of the offense, the State was
not required to submit proof of the racial bias beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" The court further concluded that the requisite findings of the
statute are best characterized as relating to motive, which has been
traditionally used by trial judges in sentencing without offending the
Constitution unless the legislature chooses to define motive as an actual
element of the offense.'
Thus, the court affirmed Apprendi's sentence. 12

A divided Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed Apprendi's sentence
but disagreed with the reasoning of the appellate division."' The court
refused to draw a distinction between an element of an offense and a
sentencing factor in determining when to apply the reasonable doubt
standard and further noted that characterizing the statute as relating
to motive simply did not answer the constitutional question. 4 The
court instead relied on decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
which hold that a defendant's prior criminal history or possession of a
firearm may be considered by a trial judge in determining whether to
increase his or her punishment for a crime.'" The court also recognized
that "almost invariably" there is no real doubt as to whether a particular
crime is committed for a racially biased purpose, and enhancement
under the statute is limited to cases in which the State has a compelling6
interest in protecting its citizens from invidious discrimination.'
Concerned that the decision may jeopardize the traditional role of a jury
in the criminal justice system, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 7 reversed the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision, and
remanded for further proceedings."

10. Id. at 1268 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (holding
constitutional a statute which permits a sentence enhancement if a trial judge finds by
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Avisibly possessed@ a gun during the
commission of a felony)).
11. Id. at 1269-71.
12. Id. at 1271.
13. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 496-97 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
14. Id. at 492 ("We must search for firmer principles of decision.").
15. Id. at 493-95 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246-47
(1998) (holding constitutional a statute permitting an alien's prior illegal entry to be used
as a sentencing factor following a subsequent conviction for illegal entry)).
16. Id. at 495.
17. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. at 525 (1999).
18. 120 S. Ct. at 2366-67.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Right of Proofto a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Overwhelming acceptance of the right to a trial by jury in criminal
cases is clearly indicated by its longstanding history. From the early to
late eighteenth century, recognition of this right even led to reluctance
on the part of many English trial judges to accept guilty pleas from
criminal defendants. 9 This strict adherence followed English colonists
to American shores ° and ultimately became a part of the Bill of Rights
to the United States Constitution via the Sixth Amendment.2 The
United States Supreme Court soon recognized that the right to a jury
trial in serious cases was of paramount importance to a fair criminal
justice system.22 In fact the Court eventually held that the right was
so fundamental to the notion of ordered liberty that it should be applied
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." As indicated by the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana,24 "[t]he
jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance
to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one
judge or group of judges."25
Of equal constitutional significance is the longstanding principle,
recognized by the Court as early as 188 1,26 that the State must prove
all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reaffirmed
this principle in 1970 in In re Winship.27 In Winship a New York
Family Court found a juvenile guilty of larceny without requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 2' The Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution requires the State to

19. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
278-79 (1978).
20. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (citing R. PERRY, ed., SOURCES OF
OUR LIBERTY 270 (1959)).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed." Id.
22. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), overruled on other grounds by Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 35, 51-52 (1990).
23. 391 U.S. at 156.
24. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
25. Id. at 156.
26. Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1881).
27. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
28. Id. at 359-60.
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prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact necessary to constitute a
crime for which a defendant is charged.29 Concluding that the reasonable doubt standard applies to juveniles as well as adults, the Court
recognized that a stigma of criminal culpability accompanies a criminal
conviction in addition to any penalties that may be imposed. 3' Thus,
the Court concluded that "[the reasonable doubt standard] is a prime
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual
31
error."
The Court has extended the procedural safeguards of the right to a
jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to determinations that bear
solely on the degree of punishment and culpability associated with a
crime rather than the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant. In
Mullaney v. Wilbur,"' the Court addressed a Maine law that presumed
that a criminal defendant charged with murder acted with the requisite
malice aforethought and denied a reduction to manslaughter unless the
defendant could prove that he or she acted with justifiable provocation.
Recognizing that murder carried a penalty of life in prison and
manslaughter carried a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty
years,33 the Court held the law to be unconstitutional and contrary to
the Court's holding in Winship. 4 The Court reasoned that because the
effect of the Maine law was to place a criminal defendant's personal
liberty in substantial jeopardy, the State should not be permitted to
avoid the reasonable doubt standard by shifting the burden to the
defendant to prove mitigating circumstances.3 5
However, two years later in Patterson v. New York," 6 the Court
limited its holding in Mullaney. In Patterson the Court upheld a New
York law, which placed the burden of proving the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance in a murder trial on the defendant.37
The Court stated that its holding in Mullaney should not be read so
broadly as to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in every instance
in which the State gauges the severity of punishment based on the
existence of a particular fact." The Court instead stressed that the
determination of when to apply the reasonable doubt standard is

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 363.
Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 363.
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Id. at 690.
Id. at 697-701.
Id. at 703-04.
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 210.
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resolved by looking to the elements of the crime as defined by the
legislature. 9 With regard to the New York law at issue, the Court
noted that, unlike the law at issue in Mullaney, an affirmative defense
is a separate issue raised by the defendant and the State is still required
to prove every essential ingredient of murder beyond a reasonable
doubt.4 °
4 1 the Court relied
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
on Patterson and
upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that required a
lesser standard of proof while subjecting a defendant to greater
punishment. The statute at issue in McMillan permitted visible
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony to be used by
a trial judge in imposing a five-year minimum sentence without
requiring proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 The Court stated
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not required because the
Pennsylvania legislature expressly provided that visible possession of a
firearm is treated as a sentencing factor to be used by a trial judge and
not as an actual element of the offense. 43 The Court further noted that,
unlike the law at issue in Mullaney, the Pennsylvania statute "neither
alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a
separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit
the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range
already available to it without the special finding of visible possession
of a firearm."44
Over a decade later, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,4" the
Court again addressed an issue somewhat similar to the issue raised in
McMillan. In Almendarez-Torres a federal statute made it a crime for
an illegal alien to return to the United States following deportation
without special permission. The crime carried a maximum penalty of
two years imprisonment; however, another section of the same statute
permitted a trial judge to enhance the defendant's sentence to a
maximum of twenty years imprisonment if the trial judge found that the
defendant had been convicted of an aggravated felony prior to the initial
deportation.46 The Court held that recidivism under the statute did not
require proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.47 The Court

39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 204-08.
477 U.S. 79 (1986).

42. Id.
43.

Id. at 85-86.

44. Id. at 87-88.
45. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
46.
47.

Id. at 226.
Id. at 247.
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acknowledged that the statute was different than the statute at issue in
McMilan because it increased the maximum penalty for the crime
rather than establishing a minimum penalty within a range already
prescribed by statute.48 However, the Court concluded that this
difference was not constitutionally significant because recidivism has
been traditionally used by trial judges in sentencing without a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt.49 Also, the Court observed that because
Congress has clearly chosen to characterize recidivism as a sentencing
factor and not an element of the offense, proof to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt is not required.'"
One year after Almendarez-Torres, the Court in Jones v. United
States5 opened the door for its decision in Apprendi. In Jones the
defendant was charged with, inter alia, carjacking based on a federal
statute.5 2 The relevant portion of the statute stated that whosoever
"takes a motor vehicle . ..from the person or presence of another by
force and violence or by intimidation ...shall-(1) be ...imprisoned not
more than 15 years . . ., (2) if serious bodily injury .. .results, be ...

imprisoned not more than 25 years." 3 The defendant was told at
arraignment that he would be subject to up to fifteen years in prison and
his indictment made no mention of subsection two of the statute. After
the defendant was subsequently convicted of carjacking, the trial judge
imposed a twenty-five-year term of imprisonment based on a presentence
report that indicated that one of the victims had suffered serious bodily
injury during the carjacking. The defendant appealed this decision on
the grounds that serious bodily injury was an element of the offense
deserving of proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.54
Raising serious doubts as to the constitutionality of permitting
sentence-enhancing facts to be proven by less than reasonable doubt, the
Court held that serious bodily injury under the statute was, in fact, an
element of the offense and not merely a sentencing factor.55 The Court
began its analysis by looking at the overall structure of the carjacking
statute.56 Although the Court observed that serious bodily injury bears
a striking resemblance to an element of a crime and not a sentencing
factor, the Court concluded that the statute was susceptible to more than

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 243-46.
Id. at 243-44.
Id. at 246.
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
Id. at 229.

53. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
54. 526 U.S. at 229-31.
55. Id. at 227, 251-52.
56.

Id. at 237.
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one construction.5 7 Thus, the Court applied the canon of statutory
construction that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by
the other of which such questions are avoided, [the Court's] duty is to
adopt the latter.""8 The Court then expressed serious doubts as to the
constitutionality of the statute if serious bodily injury is construed as a
sentencing factor not deserving proof to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.59 The Court further noted that Almendarez-Torres was not
controlling because serious bodily injury, unlike recidivism, had not been
traditionally used as a sentencing factor.6" The Court also noted that
prior convictions, unlike the factual determination of serious bodily
injury, have already been subject to the procedural safeguards afforded
by the Constitution in prior proceedings.'
Trial Court's Discretion in Sentencing Proceedings

B.

Although the Court has recognized that a trial judge has wide
discretion in imposing sentences on criminal defendants,62 it is clear
that a trial judge must operate within certain boundaries. In United
States v. Tucker,63 a defendant was charged with robbing a bank. On
cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecution asked the defendant
about three previous felonies for which he had been convicted. The
defendant acknowledged the prior convictions 4 and admitted that he
engaged in the conduct leading up to those convictions.65 The jury
convicted the defendant, and the trial judge enhanced his sentence based
on the three prior convictions. Two of the prior convictions were later
invalidated on constitutional grounds.66 The Court held that the case
should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing, reasoning that
the defendant's sentence may have been different if the trial judge had
known that two of the convictions were invalid. 7 In so holding the
Court acknowledged that trial judges traditionally have broad discretion
to impose sentences; however, the Court further noted that this

57.

Id. at 238-39.

58. Id. at 239 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. 243-44.
Id. at 248-49.
Id. at 249.
404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972).
404 U.S. 443 (1972).
Id. at 444.
Id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 448-49.

20011

APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY

1539

discretion is limited to a range of sentences prescribed by the legislature.68
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In a majority opinion, the Court in Apprendi held that, with the
exception of the fact of prior criminal convictions, any factual determination that authorizes an increase in the maximum sentence for an offense
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.69 In reaching this
conclusion, the majority remained cognizant of the longstanding
procedural safeguards provided to criminal defendants by the Constitu70
tion and limited its holdings in McMillan and Almendarez-Torres.
The majority ultimately concluded that the New Jersey sentence
enhancement at issue was "an unacceptable departure from the jury
tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system." v'
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, delivered his opinion in five
parts. Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined in the
entirety of his opinion. Part I of the majority opinion sets out the
factual and procedural aspects of the case. 72 For the sake of simplicity,
each of the remaining four parts is individually analyzed.
In Part II of the majority opinion, Justice Stevens clarified why certain
aspects of the case were not relevant to the Court's holding.73 The
majority first rejected as not dispositive of the constitutional question
the State's argument that Apprendi's sentence was within the statutory
maximum because he could have received the same term of imprisonment if the trial judge had imposed consecutive sentences. 74 The
majority also noted that the substantive constitutionality of New Jersey's
statutory enhancement was not raised on appeal and, thus, not an issue
addressed by the Court. 7' The majority further dismissed the Supreme
Court of New Jersey's suggestion that "there is rarely any doubt"
concerning the existence of racial bias for purposes of a sentence
enhancement.76 Justice Stevens explained that in a criminal case both
the defendant's purpose and his or her knowledge of the victim's identity

68.
that a
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 447; see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (recognizing
trial judge is limited to a statutory range when imposing sentence).
120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
Id. at 2363-64.
Id. at 2366.
Id. at 2351-54.
Id. at 2354.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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may be disputed factual issues deserving a determination by a jury."
Additionally, the majority recognized that the case did not involve a
question of whether the State attempted to manipulate the prosecutor's
burden in order to gain an unfair advantage over criminal defendants
because the New Jersey statute was not ambiguous.78 Justice Stevens
concluded Part II of the opinion by pointing out that the Court's holding
was "foreshadowed" by its opinion in Jones.7 9
Justice Stevens began Part III of the opinion by exploring the
historical foundations of both the right to a jury trial and the right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. 0 As the majority
acknowledged, strict adherence to both of these principles has led to
notable limitations on a trial judge's discretion in sentencing.8 ' From
eighteenth century England to the present, a trial judge has been limited
to imposing punishment within a range prescribed by law. 2
Recognizing the historical connection between the procedural
safeguards afforded to criminal defendants and the limitations on a trial
judge's discretion in sentencing, the majority noted the novelty of New
Jersey's sentence enhancement."8 Specifically, the New Jersey statute
permits a trial judge to make a factual determination of racial bias after
a jury has rendered a verdict as to the underlying offense.84 Also, if the
trial judge finds racial bias, the defendant will receive a punishment
greater than the maximum sentence he or she would have received
under the jury's verdict." Justice Stevens pointed out that the threat
to a defendant's liberty is heightened and a stigma attaches when a
statute imposes a sentence beyond the statutory maximum range where
certain circumstances are present.8 " Thus, the majority concluded that
a criminal defendant should receive the benefits of all procedural
safeguards when, as here, the State enforces a statute that extends
punishment beyond the maximum range of sentence.8 7

77. Id. at 2355.
78. Id.
79. Id. The majority noted that the court in Jones stated that "under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for
a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. at 227 (1999)).
80. 120 S. Ct. at 2355-56.
81. Id. at 2357-58.
82. Id. at 2358-59.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2351.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2359.
87. Id. at 2359-60.
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In Part IV Justice Stevens announced the majority's holding 8 and
provided an explanation of two of the Court's prior decisions that were
relevant to the issue raised in Apprendi, specifically, McMillan and
Almendarez-Torres. 9 In an attempt to limit the scope of the holdings
in both of these cases, Justice Stevens began by distinguishing McMillan.9 ° The majority recognized that McMillan is the first instance in
which the Court made a distinction between a sentencing factor and a
factual issue deserving of a jury verdict.9 ' However, Justice Stevens
pointed out that McMillan, though making this distinction, does not
represent approval of a State's attempt to circumvent a jury verdict by
merely defining the facts necessary to constitute an offense as sentencing
factors.92 Further, the majority noted that McMillan does not stand for
the proposition that a statute that imposes punishment beyond the
statutory maximum range for an offense will not raise constitutional
questions.93 Quoting directly from the McMillan opinion, Justice
Stevens highlighted the fact that the statute at issue in McMillan only
limited the trial judge's discretion to impose a sentence within, rather
than beyond, the maximum range provided by law.94
Justice Stevens then attempted to explain the Court's holding in
Almendarez-Torres.95 The Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment
concerns, as the majority observed, were notably less in Almendarez-Torres where the sentencing judge was permitted to make a factual
determination only as to the existence of prior convictions.9 6 Justice
Stevens explained that the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the
Constitution were already provided to the defendant in Almendarez-Torres during the previous proceedings relating to the prior crimes for which

88. Id. at 2362-63 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
89. Id. at 2360-63.
90. Id. at 2360-61.
91. Id. at 2360 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-82).

92. Id. (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-88).
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88) ("Section 9712 neither alters the
maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a
separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting
a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible
possession of a firearm ....
The statute gives no impression of having been tailored to
permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive

offense.")).
95.

Id. at 2361-62.

96. Id. at 2362.
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he was convicted.97 Justice Stevens further noted that the defendant
in Almendarez-Torres did not challenge his sentence because the fact of
prior convictions was incorrect but, instead, on the ground that the
State's indictment was insufficient.9 8 Although recognizing the possible
inaccuracy of the Almendarez-Torres decision, the majority declined
revisiting the validity of the decision and, instead, chose to treat
recidivism as a narrow exception to the holding in Apprendi.99
In Part V the majority focused on the New Jersey statutory scheme at
issue in Apprendi.0 ° The majority began by refusing to distinguish
between a sentencing factor and an element for purposes of requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Justice Stevens noted that
the requisite finding of racial bias under the New Jersey statute
resembles a common element of a criminal offense, specifically, mens
rea. However, the majority stated that the relevant question was one of
form and not substance.' 1 The effect of New Jersey's statutory
scheme imposed a greater punishment on a criminal defendant based on
his or her criminal culpability." 2 Recalling Mullaney and Winship, the
majority concluded that when a legislature chooses to impose a greater
sentence based on the level of a defendant's culpability, the defendant's
liberty is at stake and a heightened stigma is associated with the
offense. 103

The majority further explained why reliance on McMillan and
Almendarez-Torres is misplaced. 0 4 The majority noted that, unlike
the statute at issue in McMillan, the New Jersey statute imposed
punishment beyond the maximum amount prescribed by law and was,
thus, "appropriately characterized as 'a tail that wags the dog of the
substantive offense."' 10 5 With regard to Almendarez-Torres, the
majority reasoned that recidivism, unlike racial bias, does not relate to
the actual commission of the offense.10 6 Justice Stevens further
explained that recidivism is obviously distinct from the issue raised in
Apprendi because a defendant that is subjected to a greater punishment
based on prior convictions has already had the benefit of having those

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2361.
at
at
at
at

2362.
2363.
2364-65.
2365.

at 2365-66.
at 2365 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88).
at 2366.
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10 7
crimes submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Stevens concluded the majority opinion by explaining why the
decision would not have an effect on sentencing in capital cases.0'
Quoting Almendarez-Torres the majority reasoned that a defendant in
a capital case will have every element of the offense proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury and the trial judge will only determine
within, rather than beyond, the maximum range provided by
sentence
09
law. 1
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a concurring opinion."0 Justice Thomas determined that the question of whether there
should be proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is best answered by
first looking to the true definition of the particular crime-the ingredients of the actual offense."' Relying primarily on past cases, Justice
Thomas noted that any fact, relating to sentence or otherwise, resulting
in an increase in punishment must be charged in an indictment in order
to survive a constitutional attack." 2 Justice Thomas saw no reason to
change the analysis, concluding that the majority's holding should be
extended in two respects. First, Justice Thomas concluded that any fact
resulting in an increase in punishment, including recidivism, should be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." ' Second, Justice Thomas
observed that the majority's holding should apply to all statutes that
establish a mandatory minimum sentence based on the existence of
certain facts regardless of whether the increased punishment is within
or beyond the statutory range of punishment." 4 Justice Thomas
reasoned that when a prosecutor invokes such a statute, a trial judge is
still required to impose a sentence that is potentially greater than he or
she may have imposed through an exercise of discretion."' Justice
Thomas, like the majority, dismissed the notion that facts normally used
in sentencing should be treated differently than facts that traditionally
constitute elements of the offense." 6
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
According to Justice
Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer joined." 7

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2367 (Thomas, J., concurring).

111.

Id. at 2368.

112.

Id.

113. Id. at 2368-71.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 2379-80.
Id.
Id. at 2379.
Id. at 2380 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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O'Connor, the majority's holding is contrary to a number of the Court's
prior decisions allowing a trial judge to impose an increased sentence
based on the existence of a particular fact.'18 Justice O'Connor also
disagreed with the majority's characterization of the requisite findings
of the statute as relating to mens rea."9 Instead, Justice O'Connor
agreed with the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
to the extent that racial bias is best characterized as relating to motive,
which has been traditionally used in other contexts by trial judges in
imposing sentences without offending the Constitution. 2 '
Justice O'Connor further noted that there are at least two interpretations of the majority's holding, neither of which is constitutionally
sound."' First, the majority's holding could be read to require any fact
that increases the maximum penalty beyond the statutory range to be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but to allow the State to
impose a minimum sentence within the statutory range based on the
findings of a trial judge by preponderance of the evidence.122 However,
as Justice O'Connor noted, the New Jersey legislature could avoid
offending the majority's holding and achieve the same results by merely
establishing a minimum sentence within the statutory range when racial
bias is proven to a trial judge by a preponderance of the evidence." 3
Second, the majority's holding could be interpreted to require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt regarding facts that formally increase the
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory range, while permitting the
State to submit facts that formally decrease the defendant's sentence to
a lesser standard of proof." 4 However, Justice O'Connor explained
that New Jersey could easily cure the statute at issue by simply
establishing a maximum sentence within the statutory range if the trial
judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime involved

118. Id. at 2381-96 (citing Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998) (upholding a
California law allowing for an enhanced sentence based on proof of prior convictions to a
trial judge); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639
(1990) (upholding an Arizona law which allows a trial judge to conduct a sentencing
hearing in a case of first-degree murder to determine whether the defendant will receive
the death penalty or life in prison)).
119. Id. at 2396.
120. Id. (citing Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (characterizing a Wisconsin statute as
relating to motive which allows for an increase in a defendant's sentence if the victim was
selected based on his or her race)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2390.
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was not committed for a racially biased purpose.125
O'Connor stated,

Thus, Justice

If New Jersey can, consistent with the Constitution, make precisely the
same differences in punishment turn on precisely the same facts, and
can remove the assessment of those facts from the jury and subject
them to a standard of proof below 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' it is
impossible to say that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments
require the [majority's] rule.126
Justice O'Connor also recognized that the majority's holding could
potentially place the validity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
similar state sentencing schemes in jeopardy.127 Specifically, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the majority's holding places an overwhelming
number of past sentences under these sentencing schemes in question.12 In addition Justice O'Connor was concerned that due to the
lack of clarity in the majority's holding, both federal and state trial
judges are left in a state of confusion as to whether the sentences they
impose are constitutionally valid.'29
Joined by Justice Rehnquist, Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting
opinion. 130 Justice Breyer characterized the majority's holding as an
13
In Justice
impractical method of sentencing in criminal cases. '
procedural
fair,
contain
must
system
justice
Breyer's view, a criminal
132
position,
of
his
support
In
sentencing.
to
compromises with regard
practical
is
more
it
why
of
discussion
detailed
a
provided
Justice Breyer
133
Justice
to allow trial judges to exercise discretion in sentencing.
involved
factors
relevant
of
number
the
overwhelming
that
Breyer stated
34
impractical. 1
in sentencing makes submission to a jury in every case
Also, Justice Breyer observed that the majority's holding ultimately

125. Id.
126. Id. 2390-91.
127. Id. at 2391.
128. Id. at 2394-95. Justice O'Connor points out in her dissenting opinion that United
States Sentencing Commission statistics prove that almost a half-million criminal
defendants have been sentenced under the United States Sentencing Guidelines since 1989.
129. Id. at 2395.
130. Id. at 2396 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2397.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2397-99.
134. Id. at 2397-98. Quoting the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Justice Breyer
noted that, "'a sentencing system tailored to fit every conceivable wrinkle of each case can

become unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty of punishment and its
deterrent effect.'" Id. at 2398 (quoting U.S.

1.2).
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places a criminal defendant in the awkward position of having to deny
committing a crime to a jury while at the same time submitting evidence
as to how or why the crime was committed.'35 Justice Breyer further
noted that sentencing in federal court has been guided by the expertise
of federal judges both prior to and after adoption of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.'
After reiterating most of the same concerns
found in Justice O'Connor's dissent, Justice Breyer concluded that the
majority's holding will ultimately prevent legislatures from providing
trial judges with authoritative guidance in the sentencing of criminal
defendants."'
Justice Scalia filed a separate concurrence in direct response to Justice
Breyer's dissent. 138 According to Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer's
dissent simply placed too much power in the hands of trial judges.' 39
Justice Scalia pointed out that a criminal defendant, under the
majority's holding, will receive a punishment that truly fits the crime
committed, as determined by twelve fellow citizens and beyond a
reasonable doubt. 4 ° Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that a literal
reading of the Constitution, specifically the right to an impartial jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, justifies the majority's holding.1
IV. IMPLICATIONS

In Apprendi the Court announced a holding that will without a doubt
change the way courts review statutes permitting a greater sentence
when certain facts are present. However, a number of questions remain
in the wake of Apprendi as to what effect the opinion will have on the
present system for sentencing criminal defendants. The potential
changes in criminal sentencing that may result in the aftermath of
Apprendi depend upon how broadly courts are willing to apply the
decision. If, for example, courts choose to apply a broad reading of
Apprendi and employ an approach similar to the one advocated by
Justice Thomas' concurrence, Apprendi may result in revolutionary

135. Id. at 2398.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2402.
138. Id. at 2367 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. Id. "[Justice Breyer's dissent] sketches an admirably fair and efficient scheme of
criminal justice designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to the
State. (Judges, it is sometimes necessary to remind ourselves, are part of the State-and
an increasingly bureaucratic part of it, at that.)"
140. Id.
141. Id.
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changes in criminal sentencing. Under such an approach, a prosecutor
may be required to prove any and all facts that result in an increase in
sentence to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt even if the fact only
increases the defendant's sentence within, rather than beyond, the
statutory maximum range.
As recognized by both Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer in their
dissenting opinions, a broad reading of Apprendi could also place the
present United States Sentencing Guidelines and similar state schemes
in jeopardy of being severely limited or totally abolished.1 42 Additionally, a broad reading of Apprendi may place the constitutionality of an
enormous number of past sentences in question and, thus, subject to
collateral attack.
Courts may, on the other hand, choose to limit Apprendi to its facts
and apply a narrow reading of the decision. Under such an approach,
the requirements of Apprendi will only apply when a fact, other than
recidivism, resulting in a greater term of imprisonment increases the
defendant's sentence beyond, rather than within, the statutory maximum
range. Further, courts applying a narrow reading of Apprendi may
avoid collateral attacks on prior sentences by refusing to apply Apprendi
retroactively and subject Apprendi violations to a harmless error
standard.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit seems to
apply Apprendi narrowly in its recent decisions.
The court has
recognized the impact of Apprendi on criminal sentencing by holding
that all facts, other than recidivism, that increase a defendant's sentence
beyond the statutory maximum range must be proven to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. However, the court has sought to limit the impact
of Apprendi in at least three respects. First, the court has held that a
statute authorizing a trial judge to increase a defendant's sentence based
on facts not proven to a jury does not violate Apprendi so long as the
increase is within, rather than beyond, the statutory maximum
range. 4 ' Secondly, the court has concluded that Apprendi violations
are subject to the harmless error standard and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to Apprendi.1'
Finally, the

142. Rogers v. United States, 228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that drug
quantity must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt when a statute authorizes
punishment beyond the statutory maximum range the amount of drugs possessed by the
defendant).
143. United States v. Shepard, 235 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
defendant's sentence did not violate Apprendi when a trial judge increased a defendant's
sentence based on a drug quantity that was not proven to a jury but the increase was
within, rather than beyond, the statutory maximum range).
144. United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2000).
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court has attempted to avoid a flood of habeas corpus petitions based on
past5 sentences by holding that Apprendi does not apply retroactive14
ly.
Although the Eleventh Circuit seems presently to apply a narrow
reading of Apprendi, it is important for prosecutors, criminal defense
attorneys, and even legislators to remain cognizant of the potential
changes that could result from Apprendi in the future. Prosecutors may
be best served by expecting the worst and submitting any fact that may
increase a defendant's sentence, especially in drug cases, to the jury for
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense attorneys, when faced with a
sentence that may raise questions under Apprendi, should raise
objections based on Apprendi in order to preserve the defendant's record
in case a broad approach to Apprendi is adopted in the future.
Additionally, legislators should recognize that the constitutional
uncertainty of sentencing statutes may be avoided through careful
drafting. For example, under a narrow reading of Apprendi, a legislature would be permitted to set a high maximum penalty for an offense
and provide the trial judge with the discretion to sentence a criminal
defendant within, rather than beyond, the maximum range based on the
presence of particular facts. 46
JASON FERGUSON

145. In re Joshua, 224 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2000).
146. In United States v. Pounds, 230 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2000), for example, a
defendant was charged with carrying a firearm while aiding and abetting a robber in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The maximum possible sentence as provided by Congress
was life imprisonment. The trial judge enhanced the defendant's sentence by five years
based on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which establishes a mandatory minimum of five years
if the sentencing judge finds that the firearm was discharged during a crime of violence.
The court held that the defendant's sentence was not in violation of Apprendi because the
mandatory minimum established by section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) did not extend the defendant's
sentence beyond the statutory maximum of life in prison.

